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Abstract. Recently, several public key exchange protocols based on
symbolic computation in non-commutative (semi)groups were proposed
as a more efficient alternative to well established protocols based on nu-
meric computation. Notably, the protocols due to Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld
and Ko-Lee et al. exploited the conjugacy search problem in groups, which
is a ramification of the discrete logarithm problem. However, it is a preva-
lent opinion now that the conjugacy search problem alone is unlikely to
provide sufficient level of security no matter what particular group is
chosen as a platform.
In this paper we employ another problem (we call it the decomposition
problem), which is more general than the conjugacy search problem, and
we suggest to use R. Thompson’s group as a platform. This group is
well known in many areas of mathematics, including algebra, geometry,
and analysis. It also has several properties that make it fit for crypto-
graphic purposes. In particular, we show here that the word problem in
Thompson’s group is solvable in almost linear time.
1 Introduction
One of the possible generalizations of the discrete logarithm problem to arbi-
trary groups is the so-called conjugacy search problem: given two elements a, b
of a group G and the information that ax = b for some x ∈ G, find at least one
particular element x like that. Here ax stands for x−1ax. The (alleged) compu-
tational difficulty of this problem in some particular groups (namely, in braid
groups) has been used in several group based cryptosystems, most notably in
[1] and [6]. It seems however now that the conjugacy search problem alone is
unlikely to provide sufficient level of security; see [7] and [8] for explanations.
In this paper we employ another problem, which generalizes the conjugacy
search problem, but at the same time resembles the factorization problem which
is at the heart of the RSA cryptosystem. This problem which some authors (see
e.g. [3], [6]) call the decomposition problem is as follows:
Given an element w of a (semi)group G, a subset A ⊆ G and an element
x · w · y, find elements x′, y′ ∈ A such that x′ · w · y′ = x · w · y.
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ Research of the first author was partially supported by the NSF grant DMS-0405105.
The conjugacy search problem (more precisely, its subgroup-restricted version
used in [6]) is a special case of the decomposition problem if one takes x = y−1.
The usual factorization problem for integers used in the RSA cryptosystem is
also a special case of the decomposition problem if one takes w = 1 and G = Z∗p,
the multiplicative (semi)group of integers modulo p. It is therefore conceivable
that with more complex (semi)groups used as platforms, the corresponding cryp-
tosystem may be more secure. At the same time, in the group that we use in
this paper (R. Thompson’s group), computing (the normal form of) a product
of elements is faster than in Z∗p.
A key exchange protocol based on the general decomposition problem is quite
straightforward (see e.g. [6]): given two subsets A,B ⊆ G such that ab = ba for
any a ∈ A, b ∈ B, and given a public element w ∈ G, Alice selects private
a1, a2 ∈ A and sends the element a1wa2 to Bob. Similarly, Bob selects private
b1, b2 ∈ B and sends the element b1wb2 to Alice. Then Alice computes KA =
a1b1wb2a2, and Bob computes KB = b1a1wa2b2. Since aibi = biai in G, one has
KA = KB = K (as an element of G), which is now Alice’s and Bob’s common
secret key.
In this paper, we suggest the following modification of this protocol which
appears to be more secure (at least for our particular choice of the platform)
against so-called “length based” attacks (see e.g. [4], [5]), according to our ex-
periments (see our Section 3). Given two subsets A,B ⊆ G such that ab = ba
for any a ∈ A, b ∈ B, and given a public element w ∈ G, Alice selects private
a1 ∈ A and b1 ∈ B and sends the element a1wb1 to Bob. Bob selects private
b2 ∈ B and a2 ∈ A and sends the element b2wa2 to Alice. Then Alice computes
KA = a1b2wa2b1, and Bob computes KB = b2a1wb1a2. Since aibi = biai in G,
one has KA = KB = K (as an element of G), which is now Alice’s and Bob’s
common secret key.
The group that we suggest to use as the platform for this protocol is Thomp-
son’s group F well known in many areas of mathematics, including algebra,
geometry, and analysis. This group is infinite non-abelian. For us, it is impor-
tant that Thompson’s group has the following nice presentation in terms of
generators and defining relations:
F = 〈x0, x1, x2, . . . | x−1i xkxi = xk+1 (k > i)〉. (1)
This presentation is infinite. There are also finite presentations of this group;
for example,
F = 〈x0, x1, x2, x3, x4 | x−1i xkxi = xk+1 (k > i, k < 4)〉,
but it is the infinite presentation above that allows for a convenient normal form,
so we are going to use that presentation in our paper.
For a survey on various properties of Thompson’s group, we refer to [2]. Here
we only give a description of the “classical” normal form for elements of F .
The classical normal form for an element of Thompson’s group is a word of
the form
xi1 . . . xisx
−1
jt
. . . x−1j1 , (2)
such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(NF1) i1 ≤ ... ≤ is and j1 ≤ . . . ≤ jt
(NF2) if both xi and x
−1
i occur, then either xi+1 or x
−1
i+1 occurs, too.
We say that a word w is in seminormal form if it is of the form (2) and
satisfies (NF1).
We show in Section 4 that the time complexity of reducing a word of length
n to the normal form in Thompson’s group is O(|n| log |n|), i.e., is almost linear
in n.
Another advantage of cryptographic protocols based on symbolic computa-
tion over those based on computation with numbers is the possibility to generate
a random word one symbol at a time. For example, in RSA, one uses random
prime numbers which obviously cannot be generated one digit at a time but
rather have to be precomputed, which limits the key space unless one wants to
sacrifice the efficiency. We discuss key generation in more detail in our Section
3.
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to V. Guba for helpful comments and to R.
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2 The protocol
Let F be Thompson’s group given by its standard infinite presentation (1) and
s ∈ N a positive integer. Define sets As and Bs as follows. The set As consists
of elements whose normal form is of the type
xi1 . . . ximx
−1
jm
. . . x−1j1 ,
i.e. positive and negative parts are of the same length m, and
ik − k < s and jk − k < s for every k = 1, . . . , s. (3)
The setBs consists of elements represented by words in generators xs+1, xs+2, . . ..
Obviously, Bs is a subgroup of F .
Proposition 1. Let a ∈ As and b ∈ Bs. Then ab = ba in the group F .
Proof. Let a = xi1 . . . ximx
−1
jm
. . . x−1j1 and b = x
ε1
k1
. . . xεlkl where kq > s for every
q = 1, . . . , l. By induction on l and m it is easy to show that in the group F one
has
ab = ba = xi1 . . . ximδm(b)x
−1
jm
. . . x−1j1 ,
where δM is the operator that increases indices of all generators by M (see also
our Section 4). This establishes the claim.
Proposition 2. Let s ≥ 2 be an integer. The set As is a subgroup of F generated
by x0x
−1
1 , . . . , x0x
−1
s .
Proof. The set As contains the identity and is clearly closed under taking inver-
sions, i.e., As = A
−1
s . To show that As is closed under multiplication we take
two arbitrary normal forms from As:
u = xi1 . . . ximx
−1
jm
. . . x−1j1
and
v = xp1 . . . xplx
−1
ql
. . . x−1q1
and show that the normal form of uv belongs to As. First, note that since the
numbers of positive and negative letters in uv are equal, the lengths of the
positive and negative parts in the normal form of uv will be equal, too (see the
rewriting system in the beginning of our Section 4). Thus, it remains to show
that the property (3) of indices in the normal form of uv is satisfied. Below we
sketch the proof of this claim.
Consider the subword in the middle of the product uv marked below:
uv = xi1 . . . xim
(
x−1jm . . . x
−1
j1
xp1 . . . xpl
)
x−1ql . . . x
−1
q1
and find a seminormal form for it using relations of F (move positive letters to
the left and negative letters to the right starting in the middle of the subword).
We refer the reader to Algorithm 2 in Section 4 for more information on how
this can be done. Denote the obtained word by w. The word w is the product
of a positive and a negative word: w = pn. By induction on l+m one can show
that both p and n satisfy the condition (3).
Then we find normal forms for words p and n using relations of F (for p move
letters with smaller indices to the left of letters with bigger indices, and for n
move letters with smaller indices to the right of letters with bigger indices). By
induction on the number of operations thus performed, one can show that the
obtained words p′ and n′ satisfy the condition (3). Therefore, the word w′ = p′n′
is a seminormal form of uv satisfying the condition (3).
Finally, we remove those pairs of generators in w′ that contradict the property
(NF2) (we refer the reader to our Algorithm 5 for more information). Again,
by induction on the number of “bad pairs”, one can show that the result will
satisfy the condition (3). Therefore, uv belongs to As, i.e., As is closed under
multiplication, and therefore, As is a subgroup.
Now we show that the set of words {x0x−11 , . . . , x0x−1s } generates the sub-
group As. Elements {x0x−11 , . . . , x0x−1s } clearly belong to As. To show the inclu-
sionAs ≤ 〈x0x−11 , . . . , x0x−1s 〉, we construct the Schreier graph of 〈x0x−11 , . . . , x0x−1s 〉
(depicted in Figure 1) and see that any word from As belongs to the subgroup
on the right.
Now we give a formal description of the protocol based on the decomposition
problem mentioned in the Introduction.
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Fig. 1. The Schreier graph of the subgroup H = 〈x0x−11 , . . . , x0x−1s 〉. The black
dot denotes the right coset corresponding to H .
(0) Fix two positive integers s,M and a word w = w(x0, x1, . . .).
(1) Alice randomly selects private elements a1 ∈ As and b1 ∈ Bs. Then she
reduces the element a1wb1 to the normal form and sends the result to Bob.
(2) Bob randomly selects private elements b2 ∈ Bs and a2 ∈ As. Then he reduces
the element b2wa2 to the normal form and sends the result to Alice.
(3) Alice computes KA = a1b2wa2b1 = b2a1wb1a2, and Bob computes KB =
b2a1wb1a2. Since aibi = biai in F , one has KA = KB = K (as an element of F ),
which is now Alice’s and Bob’s common secret key.
3 Parameters and key generation
In practical key exchange we suggest to choose the following parameters.
(1) Select (randomly and uniformly) the parameter s from the interval [3, 8] and
the parameter M from the set {256, 258, . . . , 318, 320}.
(2) Select the “base” word w as a product of generators
SW = {x0, x1, . . . , xs+2}
and their inverses. This is done the following way. We start with the empty word
v0. When we have a current word vi, we multiply it on the right by a generator
from S±1B and compute the normal form of the product. The obtained word
is denoted by vi+1. We continue this process until the obtained word vi+1 has
length M .
(3) Select a1 and a2 as products of words from
SA = {x0x−11 , . . . , x0x−1s }
and their inverses. This is done essentially the same way as above for w. We start
with the empty word u0. Let ui be the currently constructed word of length less
than M . We multiply ui on the right by a randomly chosen word from S
±1
A and
compute the normal form of the product. Denote the obtained normal form by
ui+1. Continue this process until the obtained word ui+1 has length M .
(4) Select b1 and b2 as products of generators from
SB = {xs+1, xs+2, . . . , x2s}
and their inverses. To do that, start with the empty word v0. Multiply a current
word vi on the right by a generator from S
±1
B and compute the normal form of
the product. Denote the obtained word by vi+1. Continue this process until the
obtained word vi+1 has length M .
We would like to point out that the key space in the proposed scheme is
exponential in M ; it is easy to see that |As(M)| ≥
√
2
M
.
The parameters above were chosen in such a way to prevent a length-based
attack. Note that for Thompson’s group, a length-based attack could be a threat
since the normal form of any element represents a geodesic in the Cayley graph
of F . Since ideas behind length-based attacks were never fully described, we
present below a typical algorithm (adapted to our situation) implementing such
an attack (Algorithm 1).
Define a directed labelled graph Γ = (V (Γ ), E(Γ )) as follows:
– The set of vertices V (Γ ) corresponds to the set of all elements of the group
F .
– The set of edges E(Γ ) contains edges v1
(w1,w2)−→ v2 such that v2 = w1v1w2 in
the group F , with labels of two types:
• (w1, 1), where w1 ∈ S±1A .
• (1, w2), where w2 ∈ S±1B .
For an element w ∈ F denote by Γw the connected component of Γ containing w.
From the description of the protocol it follows that w and the element w′ = a1wb1
transmitted by Alice to Bob belong to Γw = Γw′ , and breaking Alice’s key is
equivalent to finding a label of a path from w to w′ in Γw.
To test our protocol, we performed a series of experiments. We randomly
generated keys (as described above) and ran Algorithm 1 (see below) on them.
Algorithm 1 keeps constructing Γw and Γw′ until a shared element is found. The
sets Sw and Sw′ in the algorithm accumulate constructed parts of the graphs
Γw and Γw′ . The sets Mw ⊂ Sw and Mw′ ⊆ Sw′ are called the sets of marked
vertices and are used to specify vertices that are worked out.
Algorithm 1 (Length-based attack)
Input. The original public word w and the word w′ transmitted by Alice.
Output. A pair of words x1 ∈ SA, x2 ∈ SB such that w′ = x1wx2.
Initialization. Put Sw = {w}, Sw′ = {w′}, Mw = ∅, Mw′ = ∅.
Computations.
A. Find a shortest word u ∈ Sw \Mw.
B. Multiply u by elements S±1A on the left and by elements S
±1
B on the right and
add each result into Sw with the edges labelled accordingly.
C. Add u into Mw.
D. Perform the steps A–C with Sw and Mw replaced by Sw′ and Mw′ , respec-
tively.
E. If Sw ∩ Sw′ = ∅ then goto A.
F. If there is w ∈ Sw ∩ Sw′ then find a path in Sw from w to w and a path in
Sw′ from w to w
′. Concatenate them and output the label of the result.
We performed a series of tests implementing this length-based attack; in each
test we let the program to run overnight. None of the programs gave a result,
i.e., the success rate of the length-based attack in our tests was 0.
4 The word problem in Thompson’s group
In this section, we show that the time complexity of reducing a word of length n
to the normal form in Thompson’s group F is O(|n| log |n|), i.e., is almost linear
in n. Our algorithm is in two independent parts: first we reduce a given word
to a seminormal form (Algorithm 4), and then further reduce it to the normal
form by eliminating “bad pairs” (Algorithm 5). We also note that crucial for
Algorithm 4 is Algorithm 3 which computes a seminormal form of a product of
two seminormal forms. Our strategy for computing a seminormal form of a given
w ∈ F is therefore recursive (“divide and conquer”): we split the word w into
two halves: w = w1w2, then compute seminormal forms of w1 and w2, and then
use Algorithm 3 to compute a seminormal form of w.
Recall that Thompson’s group F has the following infinite presentation:
F = 〈x0, x1, x2, . . . | x−1i xkxi = xk+1 (k > i)〉.
The classical normal form for an element of Thompson’s group (see [2] for
more information) is described in the Introduction.
Let us denote by ρ(w) the normal form for w ∈ F ; it is unique for a given
element of F . Recall that we say that a word w is in seminormal form if it is
of the form (2) and satisfies (NF1) (see the Introduction). A seminormal form
is not unique. As usual, for a word w in the alphabet X by w we denote the
corresponding freely reduced word.
As mentioned above, the normal form for an element of Thompson’s group
can be computed in two steps:
1) Computation of a seminormal form.
2) Removing “bad pairs”, i.e., pairs (xi, x
−1
i ) for which the property (NF2)
fails.
The first part is achieved (Lemma 1) by using the following rewriting system
(for all pairs (i, k) such that i < k):
xkxi → xixk+1
x−1k xi → xix−1k+1
x−1i xk → xk+1x−1i
x−1i x
−1
k → x−1k+1x−1i
and, additionally, for all i ∈ N
x−1i xi → 1
We denote this system of rules by R. It is straightforward to check (using the
confluence test, see [10, Proposition 3.1]) that R is confluent. The following
lemma is obvious.
Lemma 1. R terminates with a seminormal form. Moreover, a word is in a
seminormal form if and only if it is R-reduced.
Let us now examine the action of R more closely. This action is similar to
sorting a list of numbers, but with two differences: indices of generators may
increase, and some generators may disappear.
By Lemma 1, for any word w in generators of F , the final result of rewrites by
R is a seminormal form. Therefore, to compute a seminormal form we implement
rewrites byR. We do it in a special manner in Algorithm 3 in order to provide the
best performance. For convenience we introduce a parametric function δε, ε ∈ Z,
defined on the set of all words in the alphabet {x±10 , x±11 , . . .} by
x±1i
δε7→ x±1i+ε.
The function δε may not be defined for some negative ε on a given word
w = w(x±1i1 , x
±1
i2
, . . .), but when it is used, it is assumed that the function is
defined.
4.1 Merging seminormal forms
Consider first the case where a word w is a product of w1 and w2 given in
seminormal forms. Let w1 = p1n1 and w2 = p2n2, where pi and ni (i = 1, 2)
are the positive and negative parts of wi. Clearly, one can arrange the rewriting
process for p1n1p2n2 by R the following way:
1) Rewrite the subword n1p2 of w to a seminormal form p
′
2n
′
1. Denote by w
′ =
p1p
′
2n
′
1n2 the obtained result.
2) Rewrite the positive subword p1p
′
2 of w
′ to a seminormal form p. Denote by
w′′ = pn′1n2 the obtained result.
3) Rewrite the negative subword n′1n2 of w
′′ to a seminormal form n. Denote
by w′′′ = pn the obtained result.
The word w′′′ = pn is clearly in a seminormal form and w =F w
′′′. This process
can be depicted as follows:
p1 n1p2︸︷︷︸n2
⇓
p1p
′
2︸︷︷︸n
′
1n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
⇓
pn
The next algorithm performs the first rewriting step from the scheme above,
and the following Lemma 2 asserts that it correctly performs the first step in
linear time.
Algorithm 2 (Seminormal form of a product of negative and positive seminor-
mal forms)
Signature. w =Merge−,+(n, p, ε1, ε2).
Input. Seminormal forms n and p (where n = x−1jt . . . x
−1
j1
and p = xi1 . . . xis ),
and numbers ε1, ε2 ∈ Z.
Output. Seminormal form w such that w =F δε1(n)δε2(p).
Computations.
A) If s = 0 or t = 0 then output a product np.
B) If j1 + ε1 = i1 + ε2 then
1) Compute w =Merge−,+(x
−1
jt
. . . x−1j2 , xi2 . . . xis , ε1, ε2).
2) Output w.
C) If j1 + ε1 < i1 + ε2 then
1) Compute w =Merge−,+(x
−1
jt
. . . x−1j2 , xi1 . . . xis , ε1, ε2 + 1).
2) Output wx−1j1+ε1 .
D) If j1 + ε1 > i1 + ε2 then
1) Compute w =Merge−,+(x
−1
jt
. . . x−1j1 , xi2 . . . xis , ε1 + 1, ε2).
2) Output xi1+ε2w.
Lemma 2. For any seminormal forms n and p (where n = x−1jt . . . x
−1
j1
and
p = xi1 . . . xis) and numbers ε1, ε2 ∈ Z the output w = Merge−,+(n, p, , ε1, ε2)
of Algorithm 2 is a seminormal form for δε1(n)δε2(p). Furthermore, the time
complexity required to compute w is bounded by C(|n| + |p|) for some constant
C.
Proof. Since in each iteration we perform the constant number of elementary
steps and in each subsequent iteration the sum |n|+ |p| is decreased by one, the
time complexity of Algorithm 2 is linear.
We prove correctness of Algorithm 2 by induction on |n|+ |p|. Assume that
|n| + |p| = 0. Then at step A) we get output w = np which is an empty word.
Clearly, such w is a seminormal form for np, so the base of induction is done.
Assume that |n|+ |p| = N+1 and for any shorter word the statement is true.
Consider four cases. If |n| = 0 or |p| = 0 then one of the words is trivial and,
obviously, the product np is a correct output for this case. If j1+ε1 = i1+ε2 then
x−1j1+ε1xi1+ε2 cancels out inside of the product δε1(n)δε2(p), and by the inductive
assumption we are done.
If j1 + ε1 < i1 + ε2 then j1 + ε1 is the smallest index in δε1(n)δε2(p) and
therefore, using R, the word δε1(n)δε2 (p) can be rewritten the following way:
δε1(n)δε2(p) = x
−1
jt+ε1
. . . x−1j2+ε1x
−1
j1+ε1
xi1+ε1 . . . xis+ε2
R→
R→ x−1jt+ε1 . . . x−1j2+ε1xi1+ε1+1 . . . xis+ε2+1x−1j1+ε1
Note that since j1 + ε1 is the smallest index in δε1(n)δε2(p), the smallest index
in w = Merge−,+(x
−1
jt
. . . x−1j2 , xi2 . . . xis , ε1, ε2) is not less than j1 + ε1. By the
inductive assumption, w is a seminormal form for δε1(x
−1
jt
. . . x−1j2 )δε2(xi2 . . . xis).
Therefore, wx−1j1+ε2+1 =F δε1(n)δε2(p) and it is a seminormal form.
The last case where j1 + ε1 > i1 + ε2 is treated similarly.
Using ideas from Algorithm 2 one can easily implement an algorithm merg-
ing positive words and an algorithm merging negative words, so that state-
ments similar to Lemma 2 would hold. We will denote these two algorithms by
Merge−,−(n1, n2, ε1, ε2) and Merge+,+(p1, p2, ε1, ε2), respectively. Thus, com-
putation of a seminormal form of a product of two arbitrary seminormal forms
has the following form.
Algorithm 3 (Seminormal form of a product of seminormal forms)
Signature. w =Merge(w1, w2).
Input. Seminormal forms w1 and w2.
Output. Seminormal form w such that w =F w1w2.
Computations.
A) Represent wi as a product of a positive and negative word (w1 = p1n1 and
w2 = p2n2).
B) Compute w′ = Merge−,+(n1, p2, 0, 0) and represent it as a product of a
positive and negative word w′ = p′2n
′
1.
C) Compute w′′ =Merge+,+(p1, p
′
2, 0, 0).
D) Compute w′′′ =Merge−,−(n
′
1, n2, 0, 0).
E) Output w′′w′′′.
Lemma 3. For any pair of seminormal forms w1 and w2 the word w =Merge(w1, w2)
is a seminormal form of the product w1w2. Moreover, the time-complexity of
computing w is bounded by C(|w1|+ |w2|) for some constant C.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2.
4.2 Seminormal form computation
Algorithm 4 (Seminormal form)
Signature. u = SemiNormalForm(w).
Input. A word w in generators of F .
Output. A seminormal form u such that u = w in F .
Computations.
A) If |w| ≤ 1 then output w.
B) Represent w as a product w1w2 such that |w1| − |w2| ≤ 1.
C) Recursively compute
u1 = SemiNormalForm(w1) and
u2 = SemiNormalForm(w2).
D) Let u =Merge(u1, u2).
E) Output u.
Lemma 4. Let w be a word in generators of F . The output of Algorithm 4 on
w is a seminormal form for w. The number of operations required for Algorithm
4 to terminate is O(C|w| log |w|), where C is a constant independent of w.
Proof. The first statement can be proved by induction on the length of w. The
base of the induction is the case where |w| = 1. In this case w is already in a
seminormal form, and the output is correct. The induction step was proved in
Lemma 3.
To prove the second statement we denote by T (n) the number of steps re-
quired for Algorithm 4 to terminate on an input of length n. Then clearly
T (n) = 2T (
n
2
) + C · n,
where the last summand C ·n is the complexity of merging two seminormal forms
with the sum of lengths at most |n|. It is an easy exercise to show that in this
case T (n) = O(C · n logn).
4.3 Normal form computation
The next lemma suggests how a pair of generators contradicting the property
(NF2) can be removed and how all such pairs can be found.
Lemma 5. Let w = xi1 . . . xisx
−1
jt
. . . x−1j1 be a seminormal form, (xia , x
−1
jb
) be
the pair of generators in w which contradicts (NF2), where a and b are maximal
with this property. Let
w′ = xi1 . . . xia−1δ−1(xia+1 . . . xisx
−1
jt
. . . x−1jb+1)x
−1
jb−1
. . . x−1j1 .
Then w′ is in a seminormal form and w =F w
′. Moreover, if (xic , x
−1
jd
) is the
pair of generators in w′ which contradicts (NF2) (where a and b are maximal
with this property), then c < a and d < b.
Proof. It follows from the definition of (NF2) and seminormal forms that all
indices in xia+1 . . . xisx
−1
jt
. . . x−1jb+1 are greater than ia+1 and, therefore, indices
in δ−1(xia+1 . . . xisx
−1
jt
. . . x−1jb+1) are greater than ia. Now it is clear that w
′ is a
seminormal form. Then doing rewrites opposite to rewrites from R we can get
the word w′ from the word w. Thus, w =F w
′.
There are two possible cases: either c > a and d > b or c < a and d < b.
We need to show that the former case is, in fact, impossible. Assume, by way
of contradiction, that c > a and d > b. Now observe that if (xia , x
−1
jb
) is a pair
of generators in w contradicting (NF2), then (xia+ε, x
−1
jb+ε
) contradicts (NF2) in
δε(w). Therefore, inequalities c > a and d > b contradict the choice of a and b.
By Lemma 5 we can start looking for bad pairs in a seminormal form start-
ing from the middle of a word. The next algorithm implements this idea. The
algorithm is in two parts. The first part finds all “bad” pairs starting from the
middle of a given w, and the second part applies δε to segments where it is re-
quired. A notable feature of Algorithm 5 is that it does not apply the operator
δ−1 immediately (as in w
′ of Lemma 5) when a bad pair is found, but instead, it
keeps the information about how indices must be changed later. This informa-
tion is accumulated in two sequences (stacks), one for the positive subword of
w, the other one for the negative subword of w. Also, in Algorithm 5, the size of
stack S1 (or S2) equals the length of an auxiliary word w1 (resp. w2). Therefore,
at step B), xa (resp. xb) is defined if and only if ε1 (resp. ε2) is defined.
Algorithm 5 (Erasing bad pairs from a seminormal form)
Signature. w = EraseBadPairs(u).
Input. A seminormal form u = xi1 . . . xisx
−1
jt
. . . x−1j1 .
Output. A word w which is the normal form of u.
Initialization. Let δ = 0, δ1 = 0, δ2 = 0, w1 = 1, and w2 = 1. Let u1 =
xi1 . . . xis and u2 = x
−1
jt
. . . x−1j1 be the positive and negative parts of u. Addition-
ally, we set up two empty stacks S1 and S2.
Computations.
A. Let the current u1 = xi1 . . . xis and u2 = x
−1
jt
. . . x−1j1 .
B. Let xa be the leftmost letter of w1, xb the rightmost letter of w2, and εi
(i = 1, 2) the top element of Si, i.e., the last element that was put there.
If any of these values does not exist (because, say, Si is empty), then the
corresponding variable is not defined.
1) If s > 0 and (t = 0 or is > jt), then:
a) multiply w1 on the left by xis (i.e. w1 ← xisw1);
b) erase xis from u1;
c) push 0 into S1;
d) goto 5).
2) If t > 0 and (s = 0 or jt > is), then:
a) multiply w2 on the right by x
−1
jt
(i.e. w2 ← w2x−1jt );
b) erase x−1jt from u2;
c) push 0 into S2;
d) goto 5).
3) If is = jt and (the numbers a− ε1 and b− ε2 (those that are defined) are
not equal to is or is + 1), then:
a) erase xis from u1;
b) erase x−1jt from u2;
c) if S1 is not empty, increase the top element of S1;
d) if S2 is not empty, increase the top element of S2;
e) goto 5).
4) If 1)-3) are not applicable (when is = jt and (one of the numbers a− ε1,
b− ε2 is defined and is equal to either is or is + 1)), then:
a) multiply w1 on the left by xis (i.e. w1 ← xisw1);
b) multiply w2 on the right by x
−1
jt
(i.e. w2 ← w2x−1jt );
c) erase xis from u1;
d) erase x−1jt from u2;
e) push 0 into S1;
f) push 0 into S2;
g) goto 5).
5) If u1 or u2 is not empty then goto 1).
C. While w1 is not empty:
1) let xi1 be the first letter of w1 (i.e. w1 = xi1 · w′1);
2) take (pop) c from the top of S1 and add to δ1 (i.e. δ1 ← δ1 + c);
3) multiply u1 on the right by xi1−δ1 (i.e. u1 ← u1xi1−δ1);
4) erase xi1 from w1.
D. While w2 is not empty:
1) let x−1j1 be the last letter of w2 (i.e. w2 = w
′
2 · x−1j1 );
2) take (pop) c from the top of S2 and add to δ2 (i.e. δ2 ← δ2 + c);
3) multiply u2 on the left by x
−1
j1−δ2
(i.e. u2 ← x−1j1−δ2u2);
4) erase x−1j1 from w2.
E. Return u1u2.
Proposition 3. The output of Algorithm 5 is the normal form w of a seminor-
mal form u. The number of operations required for Algorithm 5 to terminate is
bounded by D · |u|, where D is a constant independent of u.
Proof. The first statement follows from Lemma 5. The time estimate is obvious
from the algorithm since the words u1, u2 are processed letter-by-letter, and no
letter is processed more than once.
As a corollary, we get the main result of this section:
Theorem 1. In Thompson’s group F , the normal form of a given word w can
be computed in time O(|w| log |w|).
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